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RECENT CASE NOTES
the deposits of the state, but prevents an encroachment on the rights of the
citizens of the state to have an equal share in the recovery of their own funds
which they have deposited in the same bank that the state had deposited its
funds. It is not surprising, therefore, that although the reasons given by the
states denying a preference are manifold, they all arrive at the same result,
and, although admitting the common law prerogative, they will find a method
for denying a preference which they regard as unjustified. Although a few
years back the instant case may have been considered to be in the minority,8 2
so far as the writer is able to ascertain, the instant ease is now in accord with
the better and majority rule. H. B.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TAXATION-SUPERVISORY CONTROL OF STATE BOARD
OF TAX COMMISSIONRS.-Action by the City of Indianapolis to enjoin the
Auditor and Treasurer of Marion County from reducing the tax levy of the
city as ordered by the State Board of Tax Commissioners upon an appeal to
said commission pursuant to the provision of Sec. 200 of c. 95 of the Acts of
1927. (Burns' 1933, Sec. 64-1331.) The complaint alleges that the action
of the State Board of Tax Commissioners in making said reduction is illegal
and void in that the section of the act in question is unconsitutional, both as
to giving the state board authority (1) over municipal activities in regard to
those matters affecting the inhabitants in that community, and (2) as author-
izing such state board to exercise both legislative and judicial power in mat-
ters of taxation. The cause was tried by the Superior Court of Marion
County and judgment rendered enjoining the appellees from extending upon
the tax duplicates the reduced levies. Held, judgmnt reversed. The General
Assembly, in enacting tax laws, has authority to reserve a check upon munici-
palities levying taxes and assessments and to lodge supervisory control in a
state administrative board.1
A municipal corporation is a body politic created by the incorporation of the
people of a prescribed locality and invested with subordinate powers of legis-
lation to assist in the civil government of the state and to regulate and
administer local and internal affairs of the community.2 The courts have
generally regarded a municipal corporation as a subordinate branch of the
government of the state and as an instrumentality of state administration for
conducting the affairs of the government.3 In legal theory the municipal
corporation is strictly public in character, the creature of the legislative power
of the state, whether that power is exercised directly, or by the state legislature.
From the principle that the legislative power of the state is the sole source
of its corporate life, follows the generally accepted rule that a municipal
32 (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 868; (1933) 17 Marq. L. Rev. 213.
1 Dunn v. City of Indianapolis (1935), 196 N. E. 528.
21 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1928, 2nd ed.), p. 369; 1 Dillon,
Municipal Corporations (1911, 5th ed.), p. 58; Schneck v. City of Jefferson-
ville (1898), 152 Ind. 204, 52 N. E. 215.
3 State v. Gullatt (1923), 210 Ala. 452, 98 So. 373, 376; Valley Rys. v.
Harrisburgh (1924), 280 Pa. 385, 124 At. 644, 648; Ottawa v. Carey (1883),
108 U. S. 110; Williams v. Eggleston (1898), 170 U. S. 304, 310; Trenton v.
New Jersey (1923), 262 U. S. 182, 43 Sup. Ct. 534, 67 L. ed. 937.
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corporation possesses only those powers that are expressly granted or neces-
sarily implied to carry out the express powers. All of its powers are held
subject to the will of the state and may be modified or transfered to other
public agencies as the public interests may require.4
There is much controversy upon the theory of the inherent right of local self-
government. Advocates of the doctrine contend that local self-government of a
municipal corporation does not arise from nor exist by virtue of written
constitutions, nor is it a mere privilege to be conferred by some central authority.
This doctrine rests upon a historical basis and the fact is pointed out that
local self-government existed before the state constitutions were created. 5
The principle of self-government has been upheld by the Indiana Supreme
Court in matters merely local.6 However, the holdings of the court have been
gradually limited so that the early cases are no longer applicable to many of
the functions controlled by municipalities when these cases were decided. The
authority of the various boards and commissions such as the Public Service
Commission,7 the State Highway Commission, 8 the Railway Commission,9 and
the State Board of HealthlO is illustrative of the many spheres formerly con-
trolled by municipalities which are now controlled by the state. Functions
which were until recently regarded as exclusively municipal, as that of control
over the local budgets and indebtedness are governed by general laws of
modern states.ll The domain of the home rule powers must yield to the
general legislative policy of the state more and more as the state expands the
scope of its activities and as public policy requires the subordination of
existing local activities to the interest of the state at large.1 2 There is no
need in this discussion to enter further into the problem of the existence of
local self-government and its extent, for the right of taxation is vested in the
General Assembly by the Indiana Constitution.13 The power of taxation is
4 Frank v. City of Decatur (1910), 174 Ind. 388, 42 N. E. 173; State v.
Abel (1931), 203 Ind. 44, 178 N. E. 683; Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. City of
Chicago (1929), 377 I1. 200, 169 N. E. 22; United States v. Baltimore and
Ohio R. R. (1872), 17 Wall. (U. S.) 322, 329, 21 L. ed. 597; Codman v.
Crocker (1909), 203 Mass. 146, 89 N. E. 177; Charles W. Tooke, Status of the
Municipal Corporation (1932), 16 Minn. L. R_ 343, 359.
5 People v. Detroit (1873), 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202; 1 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations (1928, 2nd ed.), sec. 91.
e State v. Denny (1888), 118 Ind. 382, 21 N. E. 252; City of Evansville
v. State (1888), 118 Ind. 426, 21 N. E. 252, 4 L. R. A. 93; State ex rel. Holt
v. Denny (1888), 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274, 4 L. R. A. 65.
7 In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co. (1930), 201 Ind. 667, 171 N. E. 65.
8 Hammond etc. Ry. Co. v. State Highway Commission (1926), 198 Ind.
456, 152 N. E. 806.
9 Vandalia R. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana (1913), 182 Ind.
382, 101 N. E. 85.
10 Isenhour v. State (1901), 157 Ind. 517, 62 N. E. 40, 87 Am. St. Rep. 228.
11 Citizens Bank of Anderson v. Town of Burnettsville (1932), - Ind. -,
179 N. E. 724; McQuire v. Wentworth (1932), 120 Cal. App. 340, 7 Pac (2nd)
729; Phillips v. Hume (1930), 122 Ohio St. 11, 170 N. E. 438; Leonard v.
City of Metropolis (1916), 278 I1. 287, 115 N. E. 813.
12 Ex parte Daniels (1920), 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442; Lovejoy v. Port-
land (1920), 95 Ore. 459, 188 Pac. 207; Schneiderman v. Sesanstein (1929),
121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N. E. 158; Adler v. Deegan (1929), 251 N. Y. 467,
167 N. E. 705.
13 Constitution of the State of Indiana, Art. 10, sec. 1.
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inherent in the state and is a legislative power limited only by the provisions
of the constitution. 1 4
The imposition of a tax is primarily a legislative function, and all taxation
is based on legislative authority; but the legislature may delegate this power
to local subdivisions of the state as governmental agencies to perform this
sovereign function.15 Since taxation is a sovereign power, a municipality,
being a dependent derivative body drawing all governmental and adminis-
trative authority from legislative enactment, cannot hold such power in the
absolute, but holds it subject to legislative control.1o A legislature may
delegate a small or large measure of the power and after the original grant
it may enlarge, curtail, or wholly revoke it, subject only to the vested rights of
creditors.17 It is apparent that the legislature cannot provide in detail for the
administration of the tax law and some supervision must be lodged in an
official board or commission.
The powers under our form of government are divided into three divisions:
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial.18 Numerous decisions and
authorities hold that judicial or legislative functions cannot be delegated to
administrative or other departments of government.1 9 The creation of munici-
pal corporations to exercise local 'self-government has never been held to
violate this principle. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of
legislative power, but rather as a grant of authority, to prescribe local regula-
tions according to the principle stated, and is supported by immemorial
practice. 2 0 Courts have permitted the wide delegation of powers to boards
and commissions in other respects such as the power to change tariff schedules
and regulate utility rates.2 1 Basically and intrinsically they are no different
in legal principle from the power to supervise a tax levy established by a local
municipal corporation.
14 State ex rel. Goodman v. Halter (1897), 149 Ind. 292, 297, 47 N. E. 665,
49 N. E. 7; Beard v. Peoples Savings Bank (1913), 53 Ind. App. 185, 101
N. E. 325; State v. Bristol (1902), 109 Tenn. 315, 70 S. W. 1031; McCulloch
v. Maryland (1819), 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 4 L. ed. 579; Providence Bank v.
Billings (1830), 4 Pet. (U. S.) 514, 7 L. ed. 939.
15 City of Logansport v. Seybold (1877), 59 Ind. 225; Smith v. Howell
(1897), 60 N. J. Law 384, 38 At. 180; Pioneer Iron Co. v. City of Negaunee
(1898), 116 Mich. 430, 74 N. W. 700.
16 Jones v. Foley (1889), 121 Ind. 180, 22 N. E. 987; Schneck v. City of
Jeffersonville (1898), 152 Ind. 204, 52 N. E. 212; State ex rel. Schroeder v.
Morris (1927), 199 Ind. 78, 155 N. E. 198; Zoercher v. Agler (1930), 202"
Ind. 214, 172 N. E. 186, 70 A. L. R. 1232.
17 Williamson v. New Jersey (1889), 130 U. S. 189, 196, 9 Sup. Ct. 453,
32 L. ed. 915; State v. Kolsem (1891), 130 Ind. 434, 29 N. E. 595, 14 L. R. A.
566; State ex rel. Moenter (1918), 99 Ohio St. 110, 124 N. E. 70; Cooley,
Taxation (1924, 4th ed.), sec. 84.
18 Constitution of the State of Indiana, Art. 3, sec. 1.
19 Meshmeir v. State (1858), 11 Ind. 482; Attorney General v. Brissenden
(1930), 271 Mass. 172, 171 N. E. 82; People v. Barnett (1931), 344 Ill. 62,
176 N. E. 108; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1903, 7th ed.), pp. 163-169.
2oStoutenburgh v. Hennick (1889), 129 U. S. 141; Arms v. City of Chi-
cago (1924), 314 11. 316, 145 N. E. 407; Opinion of the Justices (1925), 124
Me. 501, 128 AtI. 181; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1903, 7th ed.),
p. 261; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1928), sec. 148.
21 State v. Lears (1918), 187 Ind. 564, 120 N. E. 129; Hill v. Chicago etc.
R. Co. (1919), 188 Ind. 130, 122 N. E. 321; Winfield v. Public Service Com-
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Our system of law and government, combined with our complex social and
economic structure, necessitates the assigning of certain functions to ministerial
and administrative boards. Legislative power can be exercised more effectually
and more in accordance with the spirit of the constitution through delegation
than directly. This consideration should weigh against any rigid and un-
yielding application of the theory regarding the non-delegation of legislative
power. Such adherence to the doctrine would not be in step with the modern
trend of lodging control in a vast congeries of agencies. 2 2 Moreover, the
question of whether a commission is acting in an administrative or legislative
capacity is one of great nicety. The distinction has been made to rest upon
the exercise of discretion. 2 3 But it cannot be said that every grant of power
to executive or administrative boards involving the exercise ,of discretion
or judgment must be considered a delegation of legislative authority.2 4 The
discretion delegated to the State Board of Tax Commissioners in reviewing
the levy of a municipality seems to be a proper exercise of power and is
not a legislative act. Practical considerations make the objections of unlawful
delegation of legislative power more apparent than real. The board cannot
increase the tax; it may only affirm or decrease the levy fixed by local tax
officials. This cannot properly be objected to as an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. Boards exercising no legislative function may be delegated
duties in regard to taxation which are ministerial or administrative in nature.
2 5
The dissenting opinion in the principal case points to the evils which might
arise because of the power to limit the revenue which the municipal government
may raise by taxation. The fact that the power might be abused would seem
to be no reason for denying it. Where there is sufficient evidence of trans-
gressions, the board's functions and acts can be curtailed. The board is a
creature of the people through legislative enactment, and the people are not
obliged to continue its existence. It is submitted that the instant case is in line
with modern legal development and is sound in principle. B. S.
CONTRAcTs-DISCHARGE BY INCONSISTENT PROVISIONS OF SUBSEoUENT CONTRACT.
-Plaintiff, a public utility, operating under and in accordance with a franchise
granted by defendant city in 1899 and accepted by plaintiff, seeks recovery for
water furnished the city for the period between April 1, 1930, and June 30,
1931, at a rate provided in a contract entered into between said city and
plaintiff in 1919, the rates therein fixed being approved by the Public Service
Commission of Indiana. The original franchise was to run for a period of
mission (1921), 187 Ind. 53, 118 N. E. 531; City of Logansport v. Public
Service Commission (1931), 202 Ind. 523, 177 N. E. 249.2 2 See Frankfurter, Task of Administrative Law (1927), 75 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 614; Freund, Standards of American Legislation, p. 302.
23 Cooley, Taxation (1924, 4th ed.), sec. 78; Whitfield, Legislative Powers
(1910), 20 Yale L. J. 87.
24 Southern Ry. Co. v. Hunt (1908), 42 Ind. App. 90, 83 N. E. 721; State
v. Board of Commissioners (1908), 170 Ind. 595, 85 N. E. 513; Egyptian
Transportation System v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1926), 321 I1. 580, 152
N. E. 510.
25 People ex rel. Pexley v. Lodi H. S. Dist. (1899), 124 Cal. 694, 57 p. 660;
City of Little Rock v. Board of Improvements (1883), 42 Ark 152; Cooley,
Taxation (1924, 4th ed.), sec. 81.
